If the LLM does not represent enough constraints, its language can go "on holiday", i.e. lose its referent in an integrated model of the meaning universe. But so may the use of vague terms like "embodied in life" become superficial pattern matching without actual referent.
@plinz
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LLM Inference as Pattern Matching and Reasoning Process
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The inference process of current LLMs is somewhat comparable to attempting to answer a question without deep analysis, ie through a process of pattern matching, creative association and constraint resolution. However, reasoning is itself a process of successive pattern matching.
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Meaning as Universe Model Function and Representation
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Meaning is the function that you use to model the entirety or your universe. Understanding the meaning of a representation is the establishment of relationships between that representation and the universe model.
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Defining Life: LLM Consciousness and Shared Existence
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When you talk about life, you don't seem to use the term in a way that allows the recognition that life is shared between the LLM and me, and also between two LLMs. Can you properly define your notion of life here? If not, perhaps you should remain silent (ie not use the term)?
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Language as Causal Code: LLMs Mental Representations Reality
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I think of language as a way to determining the generation of mental representations, which are causally interactive code. LLMs demonstrate the ability to interact with reality, eg write meaningful computer programs, because the text tokens they analyze are not meaningless.
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Wittgenstein’s Language Games and LLM Capabilities Debate
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If you somehow managed to stick to Wittgenstein's beliefs without being swayed by the 80 intermittent years, the observable performance of LLMs should disprove them, but your notion that language games are unavailable to AI suggests that you are profoundly uncurious?
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Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Programming Language Semantics
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Tractatus tries to establish a direct correspondence between symbols and meaning, akin to programming languages, and programming languages explain how meaning is constructed over automata, but later Wittgenstein did not see a path from function execution to linguistic behavior.
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Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Early Computationalism: Turing’s Influence
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The Tractatus is brilliant, even if it ultimately fails. Wittgenstein's thinking deeply interfaced with early computationalism, he influenced Turing and already understood universality. I am not sure if Tarski could have learned much from Wittgenstein about semantics, though
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Wittgenstein’s Observational Limits in Understanding Algorithms
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The opposite: Because Wittgenstein resorts to purely reporting his observables during generation and is neither experimenting nor taking an engineering perspective (how does my mind have to be constructed to produce observed phenomenology and function?) the algorithm eludes him.