AI agents perform best with 5-10 MCP tools maximum. When given hundreds of options, agents make poor decisions leading to hallucinations and errors.
@fogoros
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MCP: The Missing Layer Between Industrial Protocols and LLM Agents
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MCP does not replace OPC UA, MQTT, or REST APIs. MCP aggregates and contextualizes data from these existing protocols, then exposes it for AI agent discovery. It is the missing layer between industrial protocols and LLM-based agents. Partner content with HighByte. #highbyte_iiot pic.twitter.com/GbXyMOzo0S
— Lucian Fogoros (@fogoros) 15 avril 2026MCP does not replace OPC UA, MQTT, or REST APIs. MCP aggregates and contextualizes data from these existing protocols, then exposes it for AI agent discovery. It is the missing layer between industrial protocols and LLM-based agents. Partner content with HighByte. #highbyte_iiot
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Segmented Architecture Limits Lateral Movement in ICS Security
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Segmented architecture treats each data source as an isolated domain. Compromised HMIs cannot pivot to historians or control systems because the blast radius stops at segment boundaries.
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Unified Namespace Security Risk: Single Point of Failure
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Unified Namespace creates a single point of failure for entire manufacturing operations. When one system gets compromised, attackers have immediate access to historical data and control systems.
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Unified Namespace Security Risks Industrial HMI Compromise
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Under a flat Unified Namespace, a compromised HMI in one building has a direct data path to the corporate historian. Segmented architecture contains that blast radius. See the alternative at #HM26, Stand A12. Partner content with @skkynetinc. #skkynet_ai pic.twitter.com/yuftvBGoLn
— Lucian Fogoros (@fogoros) 15 avril 2026Under a flat Unified Namespace, a compromised HMI in one building has a direct data path to the corporate historian. Segmented architecture contains that blast radius. See the alternative at #HM26, Stand A12. Partner content with @skkynetinc
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Removable Media Security Policy Gaps and Threat Coverage
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If your removable media policy only mentions USB drives, what percentage of actual threats does it miss?
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USB Device Security: Expanding Scrutiny Beyond Storage
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Any device that connects to a USB port, including keyboards, diagnostic tools, and personal phones, should fall under the same scrutiny as storage devices.
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USB Port Security Incident on HMI Device Highlights Default Settings Risk
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The phone charging incident had no malicious intent. The operator needed power, there was an open USB port on an HMI, and the device's default tethering setting did the rest.
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Beyond USB: Programmable Devices as Security Threats
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Most security talks focus on USB storage. The real threat surface includes programmable keyboards, webcams with payloads, and network adapters. Extend removable media definition beyond flash drives. Partner content with @OPSWAT. #opswat_ics pic.twitter.com/aouQOKzDO9
— Lucian Fogoros (@fogoros) 15 avril 2026Most security talks focus on USB storage. The real threat surface includes programmable keyboards, webcams with payloads, and network adapters. Extend removable media definition beyond flash drives. Partner content with @OPSWAT
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Document of Record Layer Transforms Dark Data for AI Trust
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The solution isn't bigger models or more GPUs. It's creating that document of record layer that transforms dark data into something AI can actually trust.